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Abstract
In this paper, we estimate the causal impact of human immunodeﬁciency virus/acquired immune 
deﬁciency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) on monetary poverty using a panel database from South Africa. 
We treat endogeneity and selection problems associated with HIV/AIDS by a selection model that 
includes correlated ﬁxed effects both in the level and in the participation equations, which are 
estimated simultaneously via original Bayesian methods. We model the consequences of the illness 
on both labour income and income transfers, and disentangle between urban and rural households. 
While no signiﬁcant impact of HIV/AIDS on labour income is found because of households’ 
recomposition, we ﬁnd a substantial fall in received transfers among rural population and a dramatic 
increase in chronic poverty.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C11, C34, I14, J22
Keywords: HIV/AIDS, poverty, South Africa, Bayesian estimation, Monte Carlo Markov Chain, hybrid 
Gibbs sampling
1. INTRODUCTION
According to the latest Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS or UNAIDS
estimations, at the end of 2007, as many as 32.9 million people in the world were living
with HIV/AIDS, 95% of whom in developing countries and more than 67% in sub-
Saharan Africa. Southern Africa remains the epicentre of the pandemic; with seven out of
the 10 countries of the subregion having a prevalence rate above 15% (UNAIDS, 2009).
In those countries, the epidemic has had a dramatic impact on demographic statistics,
with life expectancy falling back to levels of the 1950s according to the United Nation
Population Division (UNPD, 2008).
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While conclusions on the impacts of the illness on gross domestic product (GDP) per
capita remain mixed at the macroeconomic level,1 a number of negative economic
externalities have been established at the microeconomic level. In the context of the AIDS
epidemic, a series of studies have highlighted the impact of adult deaths on consumption
levels (Chapoto and Jayne, 2008), consumption growth (Beegle et al., 2008), activities
and income sources (Yamano and Jayne, 2004) and time reallocation (Beegle, 2005).
Other well-established negative impacts of HIV/AIDS include a decrease in savings and
investments, the reduction in school enrolment and teaching staff (Mutangadura et al.,
1999) and the weakening of family and community solidarity structures (Nyblade and
Field-Nguer, 2001; Bond, 2002). In reaction to the illness, households are known to adopt
various coping strategies to absorb income shocks, as described by Lundberg et al. (2000).
Solidarity networks of relatives and neighbours emerge and may take the form of financial
support, sharing of meals, fields or cattle, providing some labour or hosting new active
persons in the household. As a result, individual and collective coping strategies serve to
mitigate some of the short-term negative consequences of HIV/AIDS and generate a
complex articulation between the incidence of the illness and various resource flows.
The aim of our paper is to assess the impact of HIV/AIDS on household income
while accounting for its non-linear dynamics and the interaction between its sub-
components. Using a panel of six waves spanning over three years as well as Bayesian
methods, we estimate the impact of HIV/AIDS on labour income and non-labour
income, which includes public grants and remittances. Such decomposition enables
a finer understanding of the economic consequences of the illness, as each income
component may be affected differently.
For each income source, we build a selection model that includes fixed effects, both in
the income level equation and in the labour market participation equation. A valuable
contribution of our methodology is to simultaneously solve the problems associated with
time-constant unobserved heterogeneity and selection. First, the longitudinal dimension of
our data allows us to take into account time-constant unobservable factors that may affect
both household living standards and the likelihood of being affected by the virus. Second,
our methodology allows us to address the selection problem because correlated fixed effects
are introduced both in the income level equation and in the participation equation; thus,
the non-null correlation between the two dimensions of fixed effects captures the
correlation between unobserved variables that drives the usual selection bias.2 Importantly,
the estimation of correlated fixed effects makes the use of any instrument unnecessary.
We believe that this original framework to be a useful alternative to instrumentation
procedures, as long as panel data are available, and there is no obvious instrumental strategy.
However, we acknowledge important data limitations in our application case as the
proportion of individuals experiencing a change in HIV status is reduced to 10% of the
1 It is indeed unclear whether the illness would have a negative impact on human capital
formation and GDP per capita (Corrigan et al., 2005; McDonald and Roberts, 2006) or a positive
net impact on GDP per capita channelled by reduced fertility (Young, 2005). As reported by
Aghion et al. (2011), empirical evidence based on growth regressions unambiguously support the
view that reduced life expectancy would have a negative impact on income growth.
2 Another reason to model participation is the non-linearity of income dynamics induced by
decisions to participate or not; the sharp decrease in income when individuals stop participating
to the labour market is a key issue in the analysis of poverty implications of the illness.
original sample. Despite a good performance of the algorithm with such transition rates,
identification of HIV/AIDS effects appears to be somewhat weak and subject to caution.
Moreover, we do not address time-varying omitted factors linked to the illness, which
may still create endogeneity bias.
The estimation of our model via simulated maximum likelihood might be difficult
because of the presence of multiple sources of correlation (Hyslop, 1999) as well as cen-
soring in the data. So we turn to Bayesian methods that enable the estimation of complex
econometric models.3 In this paper, we use a modified version of the Gibbs sampling
algorithm introduced by Nobile (1998), called the hybrid Gibbs sampling; the idea being
to combine the two building blocks of Bayesian econometrics, the Metropolis-Hastings
and the Gibbs algorithms, in order to explicitly model the correlation between fixed effects
and observable variables. This dramatically increases the speed of convergence of the
classical Gibbs sampling algorithm in the context of endogenous explanatory variables.
The first surprising result of our estimation is that HIV/AIDS has no significant
impact on household labour income, neither for urban nor for rural populations. This
suggests that households manage to smooth labour income and participation at least
in the short term, despite the negative shock of the illness. This finding underlines the
importance of controlling for fixed effects; the observed negative correlation between
the illness and household labour income is linked to other observed or unobserved
determinants correlated with AIDS and not to the illness itself. However, at least two
important caveats need to be lodged: first, the small sample size and the 10% HIV status
transition rate are unlikely to yield strong identification of the HIV effect; then, the
short duration of the survey is another important limitation as the impact of the illness
becomes stronger over time. So it is important to flag that our conclusion pertains only
to short-term effects of the disease and cannot be held representative of the situation at
the national level. In other words, it could well be that a longer and larger survey identifies
an impact of HIV/AIDS on household labour income.
Our second and main result shows a significant and asymmetric effect of the illness on
income transfers among rural and urban settings. We find that the illness brings about an
increase in participation in the transfer network for the urban population, attributable to
public grants. On the other hand, in rural areas, AIDS seems to cause a sharp decline in
the level of private transfers, increasing chronic poverty by as much as 50%. Plausibly, this
effect could be linked to stigma and social discrimination associated with the illness as
already noticed by other studies (e.g. Seeley, 2002).
The paper is organised as follows: the first section describes the existing literature on
the economic consequences of AIDS. Then we introduce the econometric framework,
test it on simulated data having similar statistical characteristics to our sample (e.g. mean,
variance and within groups variance) and compare it with traditional estimators. In the
third section, we describe the data, setting and results. The final section concludes.
2. HIV/AIDS AND POVERTY IN THE LITERATURE
The channels transmitting the economic shock of HIV are complex and multiple. A key
contribution of this study is to disentangle the direct impact passing through labour
3 It is generally simpler to simulate a complex distribution via Monte Carlo Markov Chains
methods than finding its mode via maximisation algorithms.
income (representing productivity and labour participation effects) from possible indirect
impacts channelled by transfers (public grants and private remittances) that may be the
result of collective coping strategies. In this section, we review existing studies that address
the economic consequences of the illness on both channels.
Whereas poverty is not necessarily a cause for spread of the epidemics,4 several studies
report that morbidity and mortality related to the illness are associated with dramatic rises
in poverty in several Southern African countries, such as South Africa (Oni et al., 2002;
Booysen, 2004; Jayne et al., 2005) or Malawi (Dorward and Mwale, 2005).
The channels through which the illness affects household consumption are three-
fold. First, labour income falls as the production of the sick and often of their entourage
decreases. Both hours worked and productivity decline sharply before a worker dies,
and as a consequence, household labour income may drop by up to two thirds of mean
income (Morris et al., 2000; Loewenson et al., 2007; Munthali, 2002).
Second, expenditures in social services, medical assistance and funerals increase.
Steinberg et al. (2002) show that in South Africa affected households spend about one
third of their income on health care, compared with a national average of 4%. The high
cost of funerals has become a real threat for the economic security of households in South
Africa as shown by Ayieko (1997) and can reach up to 40,000 ZAR.5
Third, the composition of the household often changes, with old persons coming in
to help and new active people joining the household. As a consequence, the evolution
of the dependency ratio is not clear (Mutangadura et al., 1999; Rehle and Shisana,
2003; Epstein, 2004). Orphans are often hosted by extended families when one or both
parents die. According to several Demographic and Health Surveys projects conducted
in the early years of the decade on household composition, one fifth to one quarter of
households in high prevalence African countries are fostering children (see Demographic
and Health Surveys, 2000-2006).
While these coping strategies are centred around providing immediate relief, they
may hold negative effects in the long term. For instance, the fall in labour income and the
contemporary increase in health expenditure imply that households redistribute resources
and time in favour of the persons living with HIV/AIDS, entailing a cut in consumption
of basic goods and, possibly, malnutrition for other members of the household (Ainsworth
and Dayton, 2003). Moreover, there is an evidence of dissaving or of asset sales, such as
cattle and livestock, furniture and work instruments (Munthali, 2002). With production
capacity weakened and savings exhausted, in the longer term consumption may decrease
further. Human capital may be adversely affected because of children being withdrawn
from school to look after the ill (Ainsworth et al., 2002).6
Coping strategies also refer to external, collective actors such as the public sector, the
surrounding community or extended family responding to the illness. Public transfers
generally take the form of disability grants or orphans allowances, and have a heterogeneous
4 Lachaud (2007) notably reports a positive correlation between HIV prevalence and household
wealth; Sahn and Stifel (2003) find a positive correlation between education and AIDS incidence;
while De Walque (2006) finds no significant association between prevalence and education.
5 Over 5,700 US dollar (2007 exchange rate).
6 However, Coombe (2002) suggests that the impact of the epidemic on school attendance is
difficult to estimate accurately, as the reasons why children are withdrawn from school are usually
unknown.
impact on poverty.7 Private transfers composed of grants and remittances/gifts as a form
of collective coping strategy may also constitute an important monetary support8 and
can make a difference with respect to the final impact of AIDS on households’ livelihood.
However, several studies report that traditional safety networks suffer severe stress when
HIV/AIDS-related illnesses and mortality increase (Kawachi et al., 1997, 1999; Kunitz,
2001; Seeley, 2002).
3. THE ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK
This section presents the model, the estimation algorithm and illustrates its benefits
with respect to traditional panel models. The selection model displays multidimensional
fixed effects, which first address the concerns stemming from unobserved heterogeneity.
It also solves the selection problem because fixed effects are jointly introduced in the
income level equation and in the participation equation with a non-null correlation that
controls for the selection bias.
3.1 A Gaussian Model of Selection
We denote ei,t for the participation dummy and yi,t for income. Latent variables ei t,*
and yi t,* correspond respectively to the unobserved propensity to participate and to
individual productivity. The selection model is a system of two equations assuming
Gaussian residuals9
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where D(j) is the variance of fixed effects bi
j( ), iT is a column vector of size T with all
elements equal to 1, and IT is the identity matrix. We use a Bayesian framework and focus
on the distribution of parameters of interest β σj i j j j jb D( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ∈{ }( ), , , ,2 1 2 . The former system
can be written as a linear Gaussian panel model
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7 Naidu (2004) shows that a large part of the income shock caused by the illness is absorbed
by public grants in Soweto: The fall in income for affected household approaches 30%, but after
public transfers are accounted for, it is reduced to 8%. However, Webb (1995) shows that in
Southern Africa lower income communities are more likely to assume all of the cost related to the
consequences of the illness (like hosting orphans), whereas high-income communities benefit from
having the government as primary caregiver.
8 See Case and Deaton (1998) on this issue.
9 Conditional normality of the dependent variable corresponds to the log-normality of income
variables in the case study presented later.
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where ƒ is the Kronecker product. There are two major issues arising in this context: the
correlation structure of the model and the missing data because the dependant variable is
partly observed or completely unobserved as in the case of the latent variable ei t,* .
3.2 The Correlation Structure
The first issue deals with endogeneity. In order to ease simulations, we assume that
the conditional distributions of yi t,* and ei t,* are independent, in other words that the
idiosyncratic residuals of each equation are non-correlated. This is reflected by non-
diagonal terms of S set equal to zero. However, fixed effects can be correlated across the
two equations, so that idiosyncratic shocks affecting wages and participation are non-
correlated, but permanent shocks can be.10
Moreover, we would like to account for endogeneity of the observed variables, so
that fixed effects have zero mean but not necessarily conditional zero mean (conditionally
on observed variables). In short, E[bi | Xi]  0. Importantly, the correlation between
fixed effects and endogenous variables shall be modelled if we want the Gibbs sampling
algorithm to converge rapidly. The simplest solution is to assume that fixed effects are
an index of the individual means of the endogenous variables plus a non-correlated
component, as in Chamberlain (1984).11 More precisely, one can decompose the vector
of specific effects in the following way.
We note
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10 Theoretically, it would be possible to allow for both sources of correlation, but the estimation
would behave poorly, unless working with a large time dimension T.
11 Note that even in the case of non-time varying regressors, the model remains identified because
of the specification of prior distributions on each parameter. But identification is often weak in
that case with vague priors, and convergence can be considerably slowed down. However, this is
not a problem for us because all of our explanatory variables, including our main endogenous
variable, a dummy for HIV/AIDS status, are time varying.
where Xi
j∈{ }( )1 2, is the 1 by K vector of individual means of Xi
j( ) in equation (j) and X the
2 by 2K matrix composed of the overall mean of explanatory variables. We retain the
following specification:
b Xi i i= ⋅ +* λ ε (2)
with λ λ λ λ λ= [ ]′( ) ( ) ( ) ( )11 1 2 2… …K K K , a 2K vector of scalars and ε ε εi i i= )[ ]′( ) ( )1 2 additional
individual effects. Then,
X b X X Xi i
i
i i
i
i i
i
* * * *′ = ′( ) + ′∑ ∑ ∑λ ε (3)
With E Xi i( * )ε = 0 and by decomposing the covariance of regressors and fixed effects,
one obtains an estimate of l:
ˆ * *λ ρ= ′( ) ′( )
′( )
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
∑
−
( )
( )
( )
( )
N X X
sd X
sd X
D
D
i i
i
1 1
2
1
2
 
*
* ⎠⎟ ⊥with εi iX *
where r is the 2K vector of correlations between specific effects and individual means of
regressors, sd X j
j
*( )
∈{ }( ) 1 2, is the K vector containing the standard error across individuals
of individual means of regressors in equation (j), D(j) is the variance of specific effects in
equation (j), and ° is the element-by-element product. This expression is at the core of the
Bayesian algorithm because one can derive fixed effects bi from the vector of correlations
r and from fixed effects’ variances D(j).
3.3 Missing Data
The second difficulty arises from the missing data, namely that ei t,* is unobserved, as well
as yi t,* when ei t,* < 0. A powerful feature of the Bayesian approach is that the missing data
can be treated just as other parameters of interest; they are simulated. Indeed, given the
set of parameters Q, the density of Yi* can be decomposed with Bayes’ rule
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Consequently, when yi,t is observed, the data augmentation step consists in drawing ei t,*
from its posterior distribution, namely a truncated normal distribution taking values
upon the interval ]0, +•[. When yi,t is censored, ones draws the couple ( yi t,* , ei t,* ) from a
bivariate normal variable truncated on the interval ]-•, 0[ for the second component
(ei t,* ).
3.4 Estimation
Let us now describe the algorithm. The Bayesian algorithm aims to infer the conditional
distribution p(Q|Y) where Q = (b, r, ei, De, s2) are the parameters of interest, and Y is the
data. This distribution is proportional to the posterior distribution p (Y|Q) p(Q) by Bayes
rule. Some prior distributions p(Q) are set on parameters and, for usual Gaussian panel
models, priors and the sampling distribution (the likelihood) p(Y|Q) are chosen from
the same exponential family so that their product rearrange in closed form; the posterior
distribution of each parameter has an explicit formulation. Importantly, the choice of a
given prior does not imply any loss in generality as the variance of this prior distribution
can be taken as large as desirable to avoid constraining the estimation.
Inference is achieved with a hybrid version of the Gibbs sampling algorithm. The Gibbs
sampling algorithm is an iterative approach that draws from the conditional posterior
distribution of each block of parameters12 conditionally on former drawings of other blocks
of parameters. This algorithm constitutes a Markov chain that converges towards the
stationary distribution of parameters under fairly general conditions described by Tierney
(1994). As the posterior distribution of the correlation r cannot be written in closed form,
we simulate it using a Metropolis–Hasting step, which is the origin of the term “hybrid”
Gibbs sampling. In a different context, this hybrid approach has first been introduced by
Nobile (1998), and it is extensively described by Casella and Robert (2004). Priors and the
detailed algorithm are fully described in annex.
3.5 Testing
We test this algorithm on a simulated dataset and show that the coefficients of all
endogenous variables are perfectly estimated. For this test, 50,000 iterations of the hybrid
Gibbs sampling were used. The model accounts for both specific effects and time effects,
which are time dummies included into the set of regressors.
Formally, we simulate
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The endogenous variable X is specified as a dummy variable that takes value one if vi > 0
and 0 otherwise. Moreover, it is time varying as we allow some transitions from 0 to 1
for 10% of the population satisfying Xi,1 = 0. Those transitions take place at a random
date and are permanent. Hence, this endogenous variable replicates the statistical
characteristics of the HIV/AIDS dummy variable observed from the data, it has an impact
both on income level and on participation, and it is correlated to fixed effects bi
j( ) via the
time-constant component ni. As a result, the percentage of censored observations (those
for which ei* < 0) is equal to 24% among the “non-affected” population, namely those
for which Xi,t = 0, and 34% for the others. Again, these figures match the data related to
labour income.
Table 1 presents the results for three different estimators: the Tobit random coefficients
model, a fixed effects model applied to non-censored observations and the hybrid Gibbs
sampling described earlier. As a result, it is clear that the Tobit model delivers poor
12 In this context, the five blocks corresponding to b, r, ei, De, s2.
estimates of the income level equation, with a 25% downward bias on the coefficient of
interest. This was expected because of the high number of censored data (with observed
outcome zero) and because of the tight constraints set upon the functional form of
the dependent variable in this model. Moreover, with a positive correlation between
fixed effects and the endogenous variable, the magnitude of the effect is overestimated,
entailing a downward bias because the coefficient is negative.
Fixed effects estimates produce a smaller bias because endogeneity is taken
into account for the non-censored population; in that case, the coefficient is only
overestimated by 11%. Even if that point estimate is not significantly different from the
true value, this bias will contaminate poverty simulations. Again, the direction of the bias
was expected because the correlation between the endogenous variable and unobserved
determinants of participation was taken positive.
By contrast, the hybrid Gibbs sampling produces point estimates that are very
close to their respective true value. Therefore, we obtain valid estimates of the impact of
HIV/AIDS on income level and participation, which will be at the core of the poverty
simulations in last section. Importantly, these estimates are robust to endogeneity bias
and capture selection effects correctly.13 Fig. 1 describes the successive drawings from the
algorithm for the coefficients of interests and the correlations between fixed effects and
endogenous variables.
4. DATA
4.1 The Survey
The impact of HIV/AIDS on poverty is studied using a panel composed of affected and
non-affected households. A survey on households’ quality of life and resources was
conducted every six months in two districts belonging to the Free State province.14 The
first four rounds of interviews were completed in May/June and November/December of
2001 and in July/August and November/December of 2002. Rounds five and six of the
13 It is worth underlining that this approach does not rely on any instrument in the participa-
tion equation. Instrumenting participation is often useful in cross-section regressions because
identification of the correcting term, the Mills ratio, is weak though theoretically achieved. In our
case, the algorithm performs well without any instrument, but it could be possible that with
smaller time-dimension and low levels of within-variance, instrumentation becomes useful.
14 Households were defined using the standard definition employed by Statistics South Africa in
the October Household Survey, i.e. “a person or a group of persons who live together at least four
nights a week” (Statistics South Africa, 2000:0317-E) and who share resources. Interviews were
conducted with one key respondent only, namely the “person responsible for the daily organisation
of the household, including household finances.”
Table 1. Test of the hybrid Gibbs sampling
b(1) b(2) rb Xi(1), rb Xi(2), s2 D1,1 D1,2 D2,2
True values -1 -1 0.54 0.52 1 1 0.5 1
Tobit estimates -1.25 – 0 – 6.30 3.88 – –
(0.24)
Fixed effects estimates1 -0.89 – 0.38 – 0.81 0.64 – –
(0.12)
Hybrid Gibbs -1.01 -1.039 0.56 0.56 0.97 0.99 0.43 1.18
(0.10) (0.15) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.13) (0.15) (0.26)
1 On participating population only.
study were completed in July/August 2003 and May/June 2004, respectively. Thus, data
span a period of over three years (see Booysen, 2004) for a detailed description of the
survey and sampling procedure).
The balanced survey is composed of 332 households and 1,173 individuals with data
available at each wave. There is a large heterogeneity between rural and urban house-
holds. Urban and rural populations are of equal size (around 166 households), as well as
affected and non-affected households initially. Households are defined as affected if, at the
time of the interview, someone belonging to it has declared being HIV positive. These
households have been selected through non-governmental organizations and public
services working in the field of HIV/AIDS. Informed consent prior to the utilisation of
the data has been given by the concerned people or their relatives.15
Within the urban and rural populations, an equally sized comparison group of
people identified as unaffected by HIV/AIDS at baseline was interviewed on a voluntary
basis. They were meant to have similar characteristics to the affected households, thanks
to the selection process.16 Importantly, the classification of affected and non-affected has
15 HIV-positive people who accepted to participate in the study have not necessarily informed
their family about their serostatus, and the survey respondent is not necessarily the person
recognised as being HIV positive. Moreover, we do not know at what time households have been
affected, with the exception of those whose serostatus changed at one point during the three-year
span of the survey.
16 For each affected household successfully interviewed, the fieldworker chose randomly a
neighbouring household living in close proximity to the affected household. In order to ensure that
this household was at that time not directly affected by HIV/AIDS, the fieldworker asked to the
respondent some key questions, namely whether someone in the household has being treated for
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Figure 1. Convergence of the hybrid Gibbs sampling on simulated data
been revised wave after wave; households who experienced AIDS-related illness or death
over subsequent waves were reclassified as “newly affected.” This group is made of 33
households, about 10% of the original sample. Admittedly, the share of households is
relatively low, which may seem problematic as identification of HIV/AIDS effects is based
on the size of the latter group. However, it is important to stress that former simulations
demonstrated the capacity of the Bayesian algorithm to assess HIV/AIDS effects under
the same conditions (i.e. a small sample and a low transition rate).
The second important feature of the survey is the choice of the settings. According to
Statistics South Africa (2000), the Welkom magisterial district, situated in the Goldfields,
is the third richest in the Free State province. It can be defined as an urban setting.17 By
contrast, the rural magisterial district of Witsieshoek, which is within the boundaries of
the former homeland of Qwaqwa, is the poorest in the Free State province and is ranked
among the poorest in the country, with very little infrastructure and few social services.
It is important to note that the findings from this study cannot be generalised to
households across South Africa because of the small sample size, a feature shared by most
other HIV/AIDS impact studies and the context-specific location of the survey. The
results reported in these pages are more representative of the Free State province, which
has the second highest prevalence of HIV/AIDS and is also the province with the second
highest prevalence growth rate (Cohen, 2002).
4.2 Descriptive Statistics
The original sample is composed of 167 urban and 166 rural households. As shown
by Table 2, there are important differences between urban and rural populations. On
Tuberculosis, pneumonia and other diseases linked to AIDS over the past six months. Only those
displaying negative answers were retained in the control group.
17 The distinction between rural and urban setting is based on economic activities and on
the mode of governance (traditional vs. modern), rather than on the differences in dwellings
equipments and infrastructure endowments.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics (waves 1 to 6)
Urban Rural
Total Affected Non-affected Total Affected Non-affected
N 167 87 80 165 88 77
Age of head 50.5 51.6 49.4 48.6 48.4 49.0
Education of head 7.6 7.2 7.9 6.7 6.3 7.2
Dependency ratio 0.70 0.78 0.61 0.71 0.68 0.74
Active people 3.3 3.5 3.1 2.6 2.6 2.5
Average labour income1 709 593 817 535 363 702
Participation rate (labour income) 63.7 58.8 69.0 49.7 45.7 54.3
Average grants1 250 251 249 193 197 189
Participation rate (Grants) 47.2 56.7 36.8 53.2 54.1 52.2
Average transfers1,2 278 266 294 238.8 223.6 257
Participation rate (Transfers) 62.6 70.0 54.4 75.2 75.8 74.6
Average total income3 625 535 724 445.2 335.5 571.6
Participation rate (Total) 97.2 96.4 98.1 97.7 97.6 97.8
Chronic poverty 22.7 24.0 21.3 33.3 40.2 25.4
Transitory poverty 8.0 8.8 7.1 9.1 10.1 7.8
1 Computed on individuals who participate.
2 Social grants plus private transfers.
3 Computed on the whole population.
average, the urban households are more educated than the rural ones, and their income18
is 40% higher. Income transfers, which include monetary transfers and in-kind transfers,
constitute a smaller proportion of household income in urban areas, about 45% vs. 55%
in rural areas. Moreover, higher mean income translates into a lower chronic poverty
rate:19 23% vs. 33% for a 250 ZAR threshold (about 1.2 dollars a day). Unemployment
figures over the whole period confirm the vulnerability of the rural population when
compared with the urban: The unemployment rate reaches 37.3% over the six waves
for the urban population and 50.3% for the rural one (this is consistent with national
unemployment figures).
HIV-affected and non-affected households differ substantially in terms of labour
income, which is defined as earnings coming from any form of formal or informal working
activity, including waged activities and subsistence agriculture.
For the urban population, affected households’ total income is 20% lower, labour
income about 27% lower relative to non-affected households, and their unemployment
rate is 10% higher. They rely proportionally more on non-labour income (defined as all
income components not belonging to working activities), namely all public grants as well
as private remittances and in-kind gifts. These results strengthen the evidence brought by
Barnett and Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (2002) that state and
community support can make a difference for urban households affected by HIV.20
For the rural population, the unemployment rate is 10% higher among the affected
households, and labour income is 50% lower. Overall, total income is 40% lower among
the affected rural households. As an illustration, Fig. 2 reports the cumulative density
functions of labour income; of labour income and private transfers; of labour income,
private and public transfers, for both urban and rural population. According to these
graphs, public social grants are the most important component of non-labour income for
the urban population, and public and private transfers are roughly equal in share for rural
households.
18 For total income and its components, we have used real figures in adult equivalent terms:
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where y is income, n is the total number of household members and 0.6 is the adult equivalent
coefficient.
19 Chronic poverty is defined as in Jalan and Ravallion (2000). Let yi represent total simulated
income, yi represent its average, z represent the poverty threshold, and Pa be the Foster-Greer-
Thorbecke class of poverty measures. Total poverty of household i is then the expectation over
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−( )⎡⎣⎢ ⎤⎦⎥<E 1 . In practice, we have tested two cases with a ∈ 0, 2 in order to capture not
only the prevalence but also the intensity of poverty. As results are always identical, we focus on the
headcount measure and report only the statistics obtained with a = 0.
20 In quantitative terms, 70% of urban affected households participate in transfer networks
(public or private) vs. 54% for the non-affected. Most of the difference in participation rates is
attributable to social grants (public aid such as disability or destitution grants, old pension and
child fostering grants), as shown by the participation rate in social grants schemes.
Summing up, descriptive statistics highlight first a negative correlation between
HIV/AIDS and labour income among both urban and rural households; second, urban
households seem to have better access to public support measures, a finding that may
suggest a better access to facilities and information, whereas rural households do not seem
to benefit from higher income transfers. At this point, these statistics are only cross-
sectional correlations; and in the next section, we investigate whether they also reflect
causality.
5. ESTIMATION
5.1 A Sequential Estimation
As a starting point, let us address the issue of simultaneity: labour income and non-labour
income are simultaneously determined if households are rational and have expectations
on both sources of income, so that labour income may enter the non-labour income
equation as an explanatory variable and vice-versa. We assume, however, that non-labour
income does not affect labour income.
First, in the empirical literature, several authors have made a similar assumption:
studying the determinants of remittances and labour income, Maytra and Ray (2003)
exclude remittances from the labour income equation. Second, the effect of grants
on labour income is not clear cut. Regarding South African data, Jensen (2004) does
not find any significant impact of old-age pensions on the household labour supply or
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Figure 2. Cumulative distribution functions for affected and non-affected households
composition. Booysen (2005) finds some ambiguous results, with old-age pension and
disability grants being associated with lower employment, while child-fostering support is
associated with increased labour supply. Hence, it is difficult to know what would be the
total effect when those various grants are pooled together.
Last, the earlier assumption reflects an intuitive economic mechanism: HIV/AIDS
represents a negative income shock in first place, whose consequences are tackled through
various coping strategies, including extended family or community remittances and public
grants. Along this line, most of the non-labour income is intended to complement labour
income. Its increase is a consequence of the illness that triggers health-related financial
aid or compensation for the decrease in labour income. One could argue that accurate
expectations of transfers might have a negative impact on earnings via a substitution effect.
However, this view would neglect the fact that most of our sample population live in
poverty and would hardly diminish their consumption level.
In practice, we first estimate the selection system for labour income. We derive
a latent labour income yi for each non-working individual as described earlier, we use
this variable as a regressor in the non-labour income selection system and run the
estimation. In the latter case, we specify two endogenous variables, HIV/AIDS and the
latent labour income variable. In particular, fixed effects control for the endogeneity
of labour income inside the non-labour income equation. The set of regressors is the
same across both the level and participation equation; as previously mentioned, the
correlation between fixed effects captures any potential selection bias, and this correlation
is identified without any exclusion restriction as soon as a longitudinal dimension is
available in the data.
5.2 Results
Results from the Bayesian estimation are reported in the first part of Table 3. For both
urban and rural populations, we find that the illness does not have any impact on the level
of labour income or on the participation. This is surprising, especially for the rural
population, because the descriptive statistics seemed to indicate that affected households
had lower levels of income and higher levels of unemployment. This finding reveals that
the negative correlation between HIV/AIDS and labour income was spurious and carried
by some observed or pre-existing unobserved differences correlated with the incidence of
the illness. In particular, among the rural population, the negative correlation between
HIV/AIDS and labour income is carried by unobserved heterogeneity.21 Because the
impact of the illness on labour income level is not significant, it means that households
adapt somehow to the new situation, increasing labour participation of non-ill persons.
We discuss and further investigate this issue in the next subsection.
In a second step, we estimate the non-labour income equations, as illustrated by the
second part of Table 3. Among the urban population, the dummy HIV/AIDS is positive
and significant in the participation equation of non-labour income, meaning that affected
21 Ex-ante, the sign of the correlation between unobserved factors and the HIV/AIDS
dummy variable is ambiguous. For instance, the propensity to migrate may increase the risk of
contamination but might also be a source of wealth through increased information about market
or public services. In that case, the sign might be positive. On the contrary, communities might be
unequally able to adopt both health technology, such as condoms and productive technologies,
driving the negative sign of the correlation.
households receive more often income transfers. This is consistent with the fact that
urban settings have an easier access to social services. Moreover, we observe a substitution
effect between labour income and transfers in the sense that the former has a negative
impact on the latter, which likely reflects eligibly criteria for social grants.
Among the rural population, the impact of HIV/AIDS on the level of non-labour
income is negative and significant, which was not observable from descriptive statistics.
Again, this is due to the positive correlation between fixed effects and HIV/AIDS that
cancels out with the true negative impact of the illness. This result is important; it suggests
that affected rural households are deprived of vital monetary resources because of their
illness. What explains this finding is the fall in private rather than public transfers. Indeed,
the percentage of newly affected households receiving public transfers increases after
the infection from 52% up to 66%. There are two interpretations to the fall in private
transfers. One is that the latter effect is a consequence of return migrations, because the
people who used to send remittances are the most likely to be affected by HIV/AIDS.22
22 Some basic statistics show that the amount of remittances received by the group of newly
affected people decreases slightly from 120 ZAR to 104 ZAR after the illness has been declared.
Table 3. Bayesian estimation of HIV/AIDS impact
Urban Rural
y* e* y* e*
Labour income
HIV/AIDS -0.113 -0.618 0.247 -0.063
(0.234) (0.475) (0.247) (0.356)
Dependency ratio -0.146** -0.014 -0.147* -0.449**
(0.066) (0.133) (0.078) (0.140)
Education of head 0.050 0.093 -0.035 -0.027
(0.036) (0.077) (0.033) (0.067)
Squared education 0.002 -0.003 0.008** 0.006
(0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005)
Age of head 0.037** 0.070** 0.014 0.059**
(0.017) (0.031) (0.014) (0.027)
Squared age -0.000 -0.001** -0.000 -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female head -0.346** -0.641** -0.359** -0.403
(0.090) (0.190) (0.101) (0.199)
rbi, HIV/AIDS -0.09 0.09 -0.41** -0.12
(0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.11)
Non-labour income
HIV/AIDS -0.119 0.919* -0.450** 0.064
(0.286) (0.520) (0.169) (0.418)
Labour income -0.104* -0.068 0.054 -0.150
(0.057) (0.100) (0.043) (0.108)
Dependency ratio 0.108 0.558** 0.034 0.586**
(0.069) (0.151) (0.050) (0.179)
Education of head -0.060 0.005 -0.019 0.003
(0.041) (0.079) (0.027) (0.077)
Squared education 0.005* 0.000 0.004** 0.001
(0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006)
Age of head 0.041** -0.151** 0.018 -0.041
(0.019) (0.040) (0.013) (0.038)
Squared age -0.000 0.002** 0.000 0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female head 0.243* 0.313* -0.048 -0.048
(0.108) (0.182) (0.090) (0.213)
rbi, HIV/AIDS -0.02 -0.17 0.33** -0.01
(0.18) (0.21) (0.11) (0.14)
Note: Regressions include year dummies.
*, ** indicate significance at a 5/10% confidence level.
However, the percentage of newly affected households receiving remittances increases
slightly after the infection, from 27% to 34%. Alternatively, the fall in private transfers
may be the consequence of social stigma associated with the illness as already underlined
by other authors (Kawachi et al., 1997, 1999; Kunitz, 2001; Seeley, 2002).
Table 4 displays a simple fixed-effects model estimation run on labour income
and highlights the role played by the selection bias. It turns out that Bayesian and
fixed-effects estimates of the role of HIV/AIDS on income levels are relatively close and
both non-significant for urban and rural populations. Therefore, the selection bias is
negligible. This was already suggested by the results of simulations presented in Table 2,
where the selection bias had little influence on fixed-effects estimates. Again, this does not
lower the interest of the Bayesian procedure, because participation equations need to be
estimated in order to capture the non-linear impact of the illness on poverty.
Summing up, HIV/AIDS does not seem to have a significant impact on labour income
in any group. The null impact on earnings may be interpreted as a high degree of
substitutability of labour participation between the different members of the house-
hold, as shown by Chapoto and Jayne (2008) in the case of Zambia or Beegle (2005)
in Tanzania. Also, the relatively short time span of the data is perhaps a significant
limitation. On the other hand, HIV/AIDS affects urban households by increasing
their participation in the transfer networks. In particular, they are more likely to receive
public grants, which represent more than 70% of transfers as shown by descriptive
statistics. Moreover, HIV/AIDS decreases the amount of private transfers received by
rural households. Providing a strong explanation for this phenomenon is impossible with
this dataset. However, we tend to view social discrimination or economic segregation
derived from the breaking of traditional solidarity schemes as plausible candidates for an
explanation.
5.3 Discussion
This section first provides the impact of HIV/AIDS on poverty using the former
estimates, then discusses robustness issues.
Table 4. Fixed effects estimates of HIV/AIDS impact on labour income1 – Participating
households
Urban Rural Urban Ill2 Rural Ill2
Labour income
HIV/AIDS -0.009 0.367 0.146 0.393
(0.312) (0.230) (0.356) (0.252)
Dependency ratio -0.170** -0.027 -0.235** -0.021
(0.081) (0.104) (0.098) (0.122)
Education of head 0.071 0.019 0.034 0.048
(0.044) (0.040) (0.051) (0.053)
Squared education -0.002 0.000 0.003 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Age of head 0.016 0.005 0.022 -0.162**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.073)
Squared age -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.002**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Female head -0.258** -0.153 -0.189 0.068
(0.126) (0.156) (0.151) (0.221)
rbi, HIV/AIDS -0.15 -0.54 -0.16 -0.42
1 Regressions include year dummies.
2 Households who have been affected by illness/death at least once.
** indicate significance at a 5/10% confidence level.
(i) Poverty Impact We illustrate the magnitude of former estimates by calculating the
implied impact of HIV/AIDS on poverty.23 As expected, HIV/AIDS does not have any
impact on labour income; it decreases chronic poverty slightly in the urban setting
because of the increased probability of receiving (public) transfers. By contrast,
HIV/AIDS diminishes the level of transfers (rather than mean participation) by 36% for
the rural population. This has huge consequences in terms of chronic poverty
by increasing the headcount level from 41.5% to about 60%. This stresses the importance
of negative externalities of HIV/AIDS and its impact on poverty levels. Considering the
squared poverty gap provides the same conclusion: The increase in poverty because of
HIV/AIDS is large and permanent among rural households.
(ii) Omitted Variables To start with, controlling for fixed effects will not remove the
influence of time-varying unobserved components. On this aspect, there is admittedly
little to be done empirically, as this limitation is faced by any panel fixed effects
estimation.
Besides, some explanatory variables correlated with HIV/AIDS, such as the
dependency ratio and the dummy for female-headed households, possibly drive the
correlation between income and the illness. In the former analysis, we treated these
variables as exogenous ones, ignoring the possible impact that HIV/AIDS may have upon
them. We now examine the effect of the illness on these two variables.
There are reasons to believe that the dependency ratio is an endogenous variable, but
it is unclear whether it should increase or decrease in the wake of HIV incidence. Affected
households may ask some relatives to join the household in order to assist the ill, or
reallocate tasks among the members of the household as depicted by Mutangadura et al.
(1999). If the relatives joining the household only do so to take care of the ill as elderly
might do for instance, they may increase the dependency ratio. If active adults join the
household to substitute for the ill in labour tasks, then the dependency ratio may stay
constant or even decrease.
In practice, we regressed the dependency ratio on the HIV/AIDS variable, quadratics
in education and age and time dummies in a fixed-effects model for different groups: the
urban population, the urban population with positive labour income, with null labour
income, with positive transfers, with null transfers and similarly for the rural population.
For none of these 10 groups, the change in serologic status entailed a significant
change in the dependency ratio. This result takes root in a mutual support mechanism by
which active people from extended family or from the community join the household to
help. Descriptive statistics support this explanation: Considering the newly affected
23 A Monte Carlo experiment is run to generate the distribution of poverty indicators
conditionally on suffering from HIV/AIDS or not. We draw from the empirical distribution
of idiosyncratic residuals, whose cumulative distribution functions are computed with a
Kaplan–Meyer procedure. This procedure enables us to reconstruct 1,000 counterfactual values for
level and participation of labour income and non-labour income, from which we derive total
income and poverty measures. We decompose the economic consequences of HIV/AIDS into four
distinct channels – labour income levels, labour market participation and their counterparts for
non-labour income. In each case, we compare the outcomes of two counterfactual populations,
one with a positive serostatus (HIV/AIDS variable equal to 1) and a reference group with a
negative serostatus. We use point estimates for all coefficients except for HIV/AIDS when the latter
variable is not significant; in this case, its coefficient is set equal to zero.
population, we find that the dependency ratios before and after the infection are quite
unchanged as their median values are both equal to 0.5, and percentiles 75 are both equal
to 1. Whereas affected and non-affected households receive new members in almost equal
proportions (respectively equal to 26.1% and 22.4%), in non-affected households 10.8%
of new members contribute to household income vs. 18.1% for affected households. This
proportion rises to 25.8% for newly affected households.
These findings offer an explanation for the fact that the illness does not impact labour
income and that the dependency ratio remains somewhat constant: Both labour income
and the dependency ratio are rapidly smoothed through household recomposition
or extended labour supply after the incidence of the illness. As mentioned earlier, this
result is consistent with Chapoto and Jayne (2008) or Beegle (2005), who find small and
insignificant changes in labour supply of households experiencing a prime-age adult
death. Like us, the latter study argues that household recomposition is one explanation of
the lack of increase in hours worked by surviving household members.
On a second step, the gender of the household head was analysed as a dependant
variable, and it was found again that the HIV/AIDS dummy was not significant,
except for the group with strictly positive labour income in urban settings. Running a
fixed effects model for labour income on this group while excluding the female-headed
household dummy, we found a lower negative coefficient for HIV/AIDS but still not
significant.
As a conclusion, modelling the potential impact of HIV/AIDS on the dependency
ratio and the gender of household would not deliver significant effects and modify the
main conclusions of the paper.
(iii) Sample Size The small sample size (about 170 households in each group) could
entail large standard errors in estimates, maybe reducing the significance of some
effects, in particular the HIV/AIDS impact on household labour income. Moreover,
it could be argued that estimates based on a 10% transition rate (the share of newly
affected households) are not credible enough given the small sample size. It is true that
within a fixed effects panel data model, identification relies on the share of within
variance, or said differently, on the degree of time variation contained in explanatory
variables. With such a low proportion of individuals shifting HIV status across survey’s
waves, it is clear that our assessment of HIV/AIDS effects cannot be viewed as being
strongly identified or very robust. However, in defence of our results, the Bayesian
algorithm has given exact estimates when tested under the same conditions (i.e. a small
simulated data sample with a dummy interest variable displaying a 10% transition rate
over time). So the performance of the Bayesian framework remains good when applied
to the same type of data sample. However, it is fair to acknowledge that the negative
effect of HIV/AIDS on urban labour income participation is almost significant, and that
a larger or longer survey could well deliver significant effects. This is an important caveat
to the conclusion that the illness does not have any significant impact on labour income
among urban households.
(iv) Measurement Errors In addition, measurement errors on the HIV/AIDS variable
could be a cause of bias in the estimation. They could potentially explain why the
HIV/AIDS dummy is not significant in labour income regressions. Indeed, measurement
errors tend generally to bias the estimates towards zero, providing that measurement
errors are white noises independent from the observations. We rule out this possibility
because we think that measurement errors more likely concern affected households
who declare to be non-affected. In that case, measurement errors cannot be viewed as
independent white noises anymore, and in this context, point estimates are consistent.24
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have analysed the relationship between HIV/AIDS, income sources
and poverty. Using original Bayesian methods, we have introduced an econometric
framework that accounts for both self-selection and time-constant unobserved
heterogeneity. We find that the illness does not have any significant impact on household
labour income, suggesting that households manage to keep the overall labour supply
constant despite the illness, at least on the short term. Although supported by other studies,
this result might be influenced by the small size of our data sample or by its limited time
coverage. Moreover, there is only a 10% transition rate in HIV status in the sample, which
weakens the identification of HIV/AIDS effects within our fixed effects panel data model.
We also find substantial heterogeneity across urban and rural populations regarding the
impact of HIV/AIDS on non-labour income. Among the urban population, the illness
increases the probability of receiving (public) transfers. On the other hand, HIV/AIDS
decreases the amount of (private) transfers received by rural households. Although
the latter effect is difficult to interpret, we suspect that economic segregation and
discrimination/stigma play a crucial role in this regard.
As a result, HIV/AIDS causes a massive 50% increase in chronic poverty among rural
population, suggesting that the illness involves a permanent fall in household equivalent
total income. In a context of decreasing private income transfers, public support should
be strengthened together with the overall access to social basic services. These results
also reinforce the relevance of fighting the diffusion of HIV in order to fight poverty.
Prevention would be efficiently supported by free HIV testing, as argued by Thornton
(2008), while the scaling up of antiretroviral programmes could reduce morbidity and
mortality, increase labour income through increased participation, hours worked and
children’s school participation, as suggested by Graff Zivin et al. (2009) and Thirumurthy
et al. (2008).
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APPENDIX
The Algorithm
We use the following priors for Q:
β β
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σ
ν δ
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The algorithm is the following:
Algorithm: Hybrid Gibbs Sampling for Selection Model with Correlated Specific Effects
1. At iterate (j + 1), sample
β β σj K j j i i i j T
i
N
j
N B B X Y b i
B
+( ) ( ) − − ( ) ( )
=
( )
+ ( ) ′ − ⊗(⎛⎝ ∑1 0 1 0 2 1 ( * ),
= + ( ) ′( ) ⎞⎠⎟− − ( )
=
−
∑B X Xj i i
i
N
0
1 2
1
1
σ
2. M-H step:
a Draw a candidate value for r(j+1):
ρ ρ τc j u u( ) ( )= + −[ ]( ), ;U 1 1
b Evaluate the acceptance ratio a:
α
π ρ
π ρ
=
( )
( )
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
( )
( )min ,1
c
j
where p is the posterior distribution of r.With uniform distributions set on r, the
former ratio confounds with the likelihood ratio.
c Draw a random number rU 0 1; ]( ) and return
d Define
λ ρj i i
i
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sd X
sd X
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−
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4. Sample
D N Rj i
j
i
j
i
N
ε ρ ε ε− +( ) − +( ) +( )′
=
−
( ) + +( )⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟∑1 1 2 0 0 1 1 11 1W ;
and define the specific effects and their variance
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5. Sample
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6. Go to 1.
